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The Protean Environmental State in Dongguan: Reconceptualising the local state and ecological development in China

Introduction
The pace and scale of Chinese urban development is a consequence of the Open Door and Reform Policy adopted by the government since the late 1970s. This has stimulated industrialisation and economic growth in urban areas and created a demand for labour that has often been met by rural areas whose population has declined. Urbanisation and industrialisation have spawned a range of environmental problems (Liu and Diamond 2005) , including air pollution (Matus et al 2012) , water pollution (Liu and Yang 2012; Zhao et al 2013) , soil degradation (Lu et al 2015) and waste (Tian et al 2013) . How China copes with these environmental challenges is a contentious issue since it raises questions of the current dominant development model, the capacity of the Chinese state at the local and national level to regulate for improved environmental conditions, and of the environmental quality that citizens aspire towards.
To tackle the negative consequences of development, the Chinese government has formulated policies that, for example, define carbon emission targets for each provincial and municipal government, encourage low carbon development, promote energy efficiency and provide financial support for environmental protection projects. Key initiatives include the adoption of the idea of Ecological Civilisation by the 17th National Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and its reaffirmation by the subsequent 18th National Congress. Ecological Civilisation is not only about protecting the environment, but also promoting a socially harmonious society.
While there are wide-ranging discussions on the meaning of Ecological Civilisation and a new type of urbanisation (Yu 2016) , there is agreement that the objectives of Ecological Civilisation are to seek practical solutions to deliver ecological transformation. In practice, this means the Chinese government continues to promote economic development while, at the same time, aiming to protect the environment. It is a development strategy that is aligned with weaker forms of ecological modernisation (see below). Further emphasis has been given to the development of an alternative model of urban development with the publication of National New-type of Urbanization Plan (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) (Chinese Government 2014) . This consists of policies to promote liveability, social sustainability, and energy efficiency. The Plan encourages economic development to increase people s living quality but recognises the negative environmental and welfare consequences that arise from untrammelled economic development. Other related laws and regulations have also been adopted. For example, a revised Environmental Planning Act 2014 came into force on January 1st, 2015. This provides for stricter environmental protection (NPC, 2014a) , and is widely recognised to be the strictest environmental act in China's history. According to Zhang Mingqi, Deputy Director of the Law Committee of the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee, the Act requires all tiers of governments to publicise environmental information and facilitate the participation of citizens and institutions in environmental protection (NPC, 2014b) . Environmental protection thus becomes a social as well as a government responsibility.
While at the more abstract levels of national policy formulation, the tensions between development and environmental protection have become more muted, for local states they remain very real.
Conflicts between environmental and developmental imperatives can break out on multiple fronts, for example, over the nature of regulation, the protection of environmental assets, or whether to support existing industries or encourage investments in new, cleaner firms. Alternatively, though, the local state can seek to resolve contradictions in development as new coalitions rethink relationships between the environment and development and chart novel growth strategies. To better understand how local states respond to, resist or seek to shape environmental and developmental agendas, we need to reconceptualise the local state so that we move from more simplistic binary notions (Li et al 2011) . In rethinking the local state, we draw attention to local development patterns and possibilities to show how they interact with an environmental agenda to produce a more complex, multi-faceted approach to local state activities. We call this the Protean Environmental State and apply it to the city of Dongguan.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 below, we review key perspectives on the local state, particularly the ideas of a developmental and green state. We identify the weaknesses in dominant conceptualisations of the local state and argue for an approach that can encompass the breadth of environmental activities they undertake, along with an understanding of their development history.
We term this more flexible and multi-faceted concept the Protean Environmental State. In Section 3, we analyse how one early industrialising city, Dongguan, is facing up to its polluted environment and seeking to steer towards a more ecologically friendly development pathway. Here we take forward our more nuanced perspective on the local environmental state and distinguish between its traditional role as a regulator with other features including environmental recovery through restoration projects and enhancement via more resource efficient industries. These three features (or emphases) of a local Protean Environmental State draw upon a national policy agenda and a distinctive local political and economic context. This local political context is shaped by an entrepreneurial political leader and a model of economic activity that owes much to the developmental state. Throughout the text, but especially in this section, we seek to draw out the ongoing tensions between continuing to prioritise economic growth whilst seeking to protect the environment. Finally, in Section 4, we reflect upon the contribution of the insights provided by our Protean Environmental State approach to the analysis of environmental governance.
Data collection methods
Our investigations into local state activity have relied upon two approaches to data collection. First, since 2014 we have been involved in social and economic transition research in Dongguan, a manufacturing city in southeast China. Our work in Dongguan is reported in Section 3 and has involved key person interviews with government officials involved with land development, especially in the environmentally sensitive and economically important Waterside Area. Our key person interviews have rarely been one-to-one as senior figures have been accompanied by other officials.
This has resulted in a more formal and less open form of data collection. For example, during some interviews officials read from prepared statements. In total we interviewed about 40 senior figures and their accompanying officials. In addition, we have had about 25 informal conversations with government officials during guided site visits. The nature of the conversations meant that it was not possible to record them or make contemporaneous notes. However, we did compile our recollections at the end of such sessions and use them to inform our understanding of development in Dongguan. We have also examined publicly available documents, newspaper reports and discussed our work with citizens. The data collection in Dongguan is contextualised with material that has been collected over several years and from a variety of sources. These include key person interviews with officials working in municipal governments, professional organisations (e.g. China Academy for Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD) and China Society for Urban Studies (CSUS)), site visits to ecological developments and regeneration projects, and questionnaire surveys.
Second, we have also made extensive use of key national, Provincial and City level government policy statements. This is because we are interested in the ways in which government perceives public policy challenges and how its thinking will shape practices and expectations at the local level (Li and Wu 2012) . Drawing upon policy and official documents enables us to identify those areas where government seeks to speak with a unified voice (e.g. promoting Ecological Civilisation) and those occasions where sectoral or interest-based actors, that typify the silo-based approach to policy making, are to the fore (e.g. tackling environmental degradation).
Perspectives on the local state
The persistence of state authoritarianism, party-state governance and pro-growth pragmatism are central to interpreting current developments in China, and especially how it is linked to economic growth agendas (Cartier, 2015; Knight 2014) . Equally important is to understand how local states may seek to resolve or displace the tension between their economic development strategies and environmental protection. In this section, we provide a brief critique of the ways in which the developmental state, the entrepreneurial state and ecological modernisation seek to interpret contemporary environmental issues and how they may play out at the local level. At the end of the section, we draw together the analysis to suggest a way forward to analyse the local environmental state that recognises its multi-faceted nature of governing.
Two major ways to conceptualise the role of the local state in economic development are that of the developmental state and the entrepreneurial state. Although the developmental state is widely used to characterise rapid economic growth in East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, as Horesh and Lim (2017) point out there is a distinct Chinese variation that reflects the ou tr s socially uneven development and the role of state-owned enterprises. A key approach to the developmental state is provided by Blecher and Shue (1996 and 2001) who analyse how a local state (county level government) plays direct and indirect roles to pla , finance, and implement developmental proje ts (Blecher, 1991: 268) . The role of the local state is to support the activities of companies as best it can, including identifying those companies or sectors which are most likely to be successful. In a variant of the model, the entrepreneurial state is proposed by Jean Oi (1992) and
Andrew Walder (1995) . Both Oi and Walder understand a local state as acting like an entrepreneur.
For instance, local state leaders perform the role of a board of directors in a company to make profits from Township Village Enterprises (TVEs) and sell land to maximise extra revenue for local government expenses and retain tax earnings (Lin, 2009; Oi, 1992 and 1999) . For Oi (1992: 100-1), lo al government coordinates economic enterprises in its territories as if it were a diversified business orporatio . In contrast to the developmental state model, which locates entrepreneurialism in the local business community, here it is to be equally found in the local state because local officials will wish to expand revenue-generating activities (Oi 1992: 113) , especially the e tra tio of profits from e terprises (Oi 1992: 118) . To promote successful local enterprises local governments can exercise control over factory management, offer privileged access to resources (e.g. raw materials, energy), provide investment and credit and make available bureaucratic services (e.g. prizes) (Oi 1992: 118-22) . In the process, a significant outcome is the partnership between local businesses and governments due to their common interest in economic growth (Yu and Zhu, 2009 ); the local state innovates to provide support mechanisms to enable firms to flourish.
The principles of the local developmental state and the entrepreneurial state fit well the development context of Chinese reform and Open Door policies, which started off a process of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Rapid economic growth in China during the last four decades has owed much to powers being decentralised to local governments who have been very flexible to cope with rapid changes in the market. Both the developmental state and entrepreneurial state models are helpful in explaining why local states, with their variable economic opportunities will adopt different local economic development strategies. It is less clear, though, how these models may cope with more recent economic restructuring arising from financial crises and rethinking of the nature of environmental governance.
While state objectives and institutional arrangements can be modified to promote a revised developmental state (Knight 2014 , Zhang 2018 , it is by no means straightforward. It is not apparent how the developmental state thesis helps in understanding the ways in which local states may seek to develop alternative models which, at least to some extent, seek to incorporate economic and environmental imperatives. Meanwhile, conditions in which growth slows dramatically may not make it so straightforward to support leading companies or sectors. It is therefore rather problematic to show that the model of the entrepreneurial state or that of the developmental state can be reconfigured so that it seeks to resolve rather than exacerbate current public policy and citizen concerns.
To overcome some of these challenges on how to conceptualise the local state, there has been a fruitful rethinking of work on entrepreneurial governance. Har e s (1989) argument that urban development in the West is increasingly characterised by state supported entrepreneurial activities, such as backing for small firms, infrastructure investment and loans, has struck a resonant chord for work on China (Xue and Wu 2015), including shifts towards more ecologically informed development (Pow and Neo 2013; Pow and Neo 2015; Xu 2017) . Pow and Neo (2013) argue that state-business coalitions are i aga eeri g eco-forms of development as ways of promoting urban development and renewal. They point out a more entrepreneurial approach from government actors fits well with officials who are sympathetic to pro-growth thinking and the potential advantages of local economic development for their career advancement. As a result, development is only partially environmentally led. Priority is given to the visible, with a focus on remade city landscapes that are clean and green (Pow and Neo 2015: 2264) . Xu (2017) similarly points to the tensions between entrepreneurial governance and eco-development but believes that these can be reconciled.
Following the work of While et al (2004), Xu argues that there needs to be a better understanding of how state power plays out in different national and city contexts, because in some cases environmental issues are not simply a response to a national agenda but rather integral to a revised local development perspective. Development can therefore be simultaneously oth environmental and e trepre eurial (Xu 2017: 703).
In its revised form the entrepreneurial state perspective clarifies why large-scale eco-developments may take place in major cities, and how state and business interests can coordinate their efforts to reimagine the urban form. What the perspective tends to do, though, is overemphasise ig projects and initiatives linked to city rebuilding/rebranding and underemphasise activities such as environmental regulation that are integral to the environmental state. Part of the reason why both the developmental state and entrepreneurial state models fail to sufficiently incorporate the potentially widespread and deep-rooted significance of environmental imperatives is because they overemphasise state-driven transformation processes, which results in an unduly static understanding of state-market relations and state-environment relations.
An alternative model, and one which emphasises the relationship between the market and the environment, as well as the breadth of government environment responsibilities, is that of the green state, promoted by those sympathetic to ecological modernisation. As Mol explains, E ologi al
Modernisation indicates the possibility of overcoming the environmental crisis while making use of the institutions of modernity and without leaving the path of oder izatio (Mol, 1995: 37) . The core mechanism of ecological modernisation theory is re-e eddi g ecology into economic modernisation through e ologisi g the e o o and e o o isi g the e olog (cf. Huber 1982 cited in Mol, 1995: 30) . Ecological modernisation has become both a commentary on the way in which Western states integrate environmental issues into previously narrowly dominated economic arenas and a prescription for further reform, for example, in political institutions and regulatory frameworks. For the proponents of ecological modernisation, it is at heart an optimistic model of relations between the environment and development (Mol, 1995; 2006; York and Rosa, 2003) .
Perhaps the most notable contribution to current understandings of ecological modernisation in
China came from the report by the influential Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 2007 (CCMR 2007) . The CAS report highlighted the role of technology in ecological modernisation thinking but gave less emphasis to reform of social institutions (e.g. decision-making processes). A less inclusive approach to decision making, along with the country's top-down delivery mechanism may mean that ecological reforms to protect the environment and stimulate green economic development can be more quickly and widely diffused than in more democratic societies.
There have, though, been several pertinent criticisms of ecological modernisation. Christoff (1996) , for example, in comments directed towards western advocates of ecological modernisation, but which are equally relevant to the Chinese case, pointed out that it provides a technocratic solution to environmental problems, and unless strengthened would fail to recognise the more deep-rooted conflicts in institutions that undermine ecological progress. Subsequently, more attention has been paid to how the state, market and society interact (Buttel 2000) , and to exploring the different ways in which ecological modernisation may take root in different societies. Here the work of Mol and his colleagues has been particularly influential (see Carter and Mol 2007; Mol, 2006; Phung 2002; Zhang 2002) . There is a growing recognition at both national and local levels that ideas of ecological modernisation are informing policy development and practice in China (e.g. CCMR 2007 , Zhang et al 2007 , Mol 2006 ) and need to be taken into account in explanations of contemporary policy development and delivery.
To summarise the argument so far: advocates of ecological modernisation overemphasize shifts in policy and pay insufficient attention to the complex nature of local state activity. As a result, there is the potential for ecological modernisation theory to fail to sufficiently appreciate how environmental issues play out in practice. The development and entrepreneurial state perspectives emphasise the historical roots of development but pay insufficient account to the emergence of a wider environmental agenda and how that may reshape our understanding of the contemporary local state. In analysing the local state and how it is transforming we need to give serious attention to both its operation and its instutionalisation of environmental issues. To do otherwise will lead to a partial analysis that risks underplaying or exaggerating the environmental agenda at the local level.
We also need to recognise the breadth of local environmental activities. These include regulation, the recovery of damaged environmental assets and enhancing the local environment (e.g.
regeneration to lea -up a city, recreating an urban imagery, or the promotion of low carbon firms). Finally, attention must be given to the distinctiveness of local development trajectories, and of who has the po er to organise spa e (Harvey 1989: 6) . As we show below, governance, development and the environment are increasingly being connected in complex and contested ways.
Our starting point for a revised model of the environmental state is, like that of Li et al (2011: 116) to recognise that the binary perspective of economic development versus environmental protection is inadequate. Second, we focus on place, so drawing attention to the nature and impacts of more localised development initiatives (Harvey 1989) . Urban entrepreneurialism helps to reimagine places. For our case study city of Dongguan this means reconstructing an image of a place that is the fa tor of the orld and a haven for polluting companies to one in which it can transition to the promotion of culture and tourism and is home to high-tech industry. Third, as both the developmental and entrepreneurial state perspectives suggest, an understanding of place must be rooted in an appreciation of the local development context since this both enables and constrains economic and environmental possibilities. Fourth, is the recognition of the role that individuals may play in shaping the nature of development (Harvey 1989: 7) . This can be highly important in the Chinese context where city or provincial leaders can knit together a wide-ranging state apparatus to direct and deliver change. In addition, the links between state and market actors are much closer than those of liberal market economies providing a further mechanism to steer change. 
Shaping the environmental state in Dongguan
In this section, we outline how national policy to promote more environmentally informed development interacted with a local economic development strategy promoted by the Provincial Party General Secretary, Wang Yang, to shape the local environmental state in Dongguan. In closing polluting firms and seeking to attract high-tech, low carbon companies, Wang Yang sought to utilise national symbols of economic development to justify his strategy (Lim 2016) but was also able to legitimise his approach because of the emerging national environmental agenda. This too supported economic restructuring (see also Li et al 2011) . As we argue, national environmental policy, economic reform and the practices of the developmental state have done much to form the contemporary environmental state in Dongguan.
Local politics and national strategies
Dongguan is part of a nationally important economic area, the Pearl River Delta. It is in Guangdong
Province and has two other major cities nearby, Shenzhen and Guangzhou. It was one of the earliest cities to take advantage of Chi a s Open Door policy and quickly grew into an industrial centre, benefitting from its proximity to Hong Kong and local political elites who were willing to attract FDI (Yin and Jiang, 2003; Rolf 2019 , Oi 1992 and Walder 1995 . It is difficult to exaggerate the scale and rapidity of change.
Out of a total of 581 villages in Dongguan 512 established their own factories and/or joint venture enterprises (Yin and Jiang, 2003) . Township and village governments participated directly in economic development by attracting and supporting investment with the appointment of staff to support companies (Shan and Tsai 2016). For example, Wusha Village in Dongguan, with a local Hukou population of 3483, attracted and set up 265 enterprises which employed more than 70,000 migrant workers (Yin and Jiang, 2003 
Economic imperatives, environmental conditions and the reshaping of the environmental state
Promoting a township model of development has been at great cost to the environment. Working to the policy of de elop e t is the absolutely priorit town governments and village leaders in Dongguan and elsewhere failed to recognise the devastating consequences of pollution for human health or the environment, and when they did begin to recognise problems failed to act sufficiently quickly or robustly. The long shadow cast by prioritising development stifled efforts at environmental reform or even the implementation of regulations. Typically, environmental standards were regarded as a potential economic cost and curb on growth (interviews with senior officials of the Dongguan Environmental Protection Bureau January 2014). Interviewees emphasised the significance of Dongguan s Waterside Area, made up of multiple rivers, that makes for a very sensitive environment. Data produced by the Dongguan Environmental Protection Bureau (2014) shows that more than 13 different sectors with more than 650 factories generated severe pollution to rivers in 2013. These polluting factories were in areas of high population density (Figure 1 ) and
can be matched to the location of wastewater discharging points (Figure 2 ). Due to the direct discharging of untreated effluent into rivers the overall water quality is poor. Ground water in China is divided into five different categories from Class I which is Excellent to Class V which is Severely Polluted. When monitoring water quality between January and July 2013 in 10 rivers, the Environmental Protection Bureau found that 75% were in poor quality and of class IV, a finding that was reinforced by the monitoring of 18 sections of river in the following year (Dongguan Environmental Protection Bureau, 2014). The quote is revealing for several reasons. First, Dongguan Government recognised the local environmental state was multifaceted by bringing together the regulatory and recovery state. There is also a connection to the environmental enhancement activities that could take place since the demonstration area would seek to attract companies, though this has proved to be challenging (see below). Second, local activities are being legitimated through recourse to a key national environmental strategy, that of Ecological Civilisation. Third, there is an environmental spatial fix (Castree 2008a and b) in which recovery in the Waterside Area is linked to revised forms of economic activity as tourism can be promoted, and river boat trips are becoming increasingly popular (see Figure 3 ).
Environmental investments are socially and spatially variable. In 2015, there were investments in upgrading 400km of the wastewater network and 11 new or expanded sewage treatment works were completed (Dongguan Government 2016). A senior figure in the Waterside Administrative Commission pointed out that such investments are important in seeking to recover a highly polluted water environment. Making river water cleaner was accompanied by extensive planting. The vibrant colours of water plants vividly represented the cleansing of rivers (see Figure 3) . Riverside plants and enhanced access to riversides are largely for the enjoyment of local social and political elites and not migrants or local workers. Indeed, in some rivers, although water quality may have improved it remained polluted and continues to be used for traditional activities such as washing (see Figure 4 ).
Despite the investments in sewage treatment for homes in Dongguan, as well as those upstream, there continues to be a discharge of sewage into waterways. for what they might mean for neighbouring areas or the city.
One popular development is the construction of waterside towns and villages (see Figure 5 ).
Previously citizens would have shunned waterways, but these now become desirable locations.
Construction of homes and the small-scale commercial enterprises that go with them (e.g. shops, restaurants, boat trips) help citizens to re-engage with water as an environmental asset. Building gain from improved air quality and some traditional communities benefit from better water quality and sewerage infrastructure, but beyond that, for many local people and igra ts debates on environmental quality have little interest (discussions with community leaders). The environmental enhancement state can facilitate additional opportunities to access the environment, but this will be limited, for example, to those who live in a new waterside community, anglers, and those who participate in tourism activities such as river boat rides.
Finally, we need to consider the prospects for the Protean Environmental State in Dongguan and what it may have achieved. More rigorous environmental regulation was allied to economic restructuring to legitimate reform activities. Is there an institutionalisation of environmental management? Is there an improvement in the environment? We can go some way to answering these questions by examining data on environmental quality and reviewing regulatory practices.
There is an irony in that although more environmental data is being collected by local officials, accessing it in a timely manner has become more problematic (Rhode and Miller 2015: 2) .
Consequently, assessments of how environmental quality in Dongguan may have changed over time need to draw upon a variety of data sources. In terms of the Protean Environmental State we are interested in regulatory, recovery and enhancement information. We consider each of these in turn below.
The key regulatory issues in Dongguan have related to enforcement activities for air and water quality. According to a mayor in Jiangsu province, regulation typically follows a process of i spe tio , rectification and pu ish e t (Reuters 2018) , and this certainly holds for Dongguan.
Dongguan government identified 136 major pollutant discharging sources from sectors such as clothing, paper making, thermal power that have been monitored and supervised on a regular basis.
In addition, between 2016 and 2018, 31896 enterprises were punished for discharging pollutants.
These included leather processing firms, plastic mould factories, hardware companies, power suppliers, wool and textile factories, handicrafts, paper mills, concrete producers, shoe factories, furniture companies, and electronics firms (Dongguan Municipal Bureau of Environmental Protection (2018a). Despite the evidence of regulatory activity, Dongguan has been caught up in renewed central government efforts to curb polluting activities and exhorted to take further efforts to sanction polluters (Reuters 2018) .
Air quality in China has significantly improved in recent years (CAAC 2017) . NASA data on air quality for Guangdong and its key cities, such as Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangzhou show similar marked reductions in NO2 between 2005-16 (see Table 1 ), though, air pollution, as measured by NO2, remains worryingly high. In contrast, Tianjin a city with a long-standing record of pollution showed a much more modest reduction in NO2. An important reason why NO2 fell across the province rather than simply for an individual city, such as Dongguan, was that Guangdong closed many smaller, and potentially inefficient, power stations than any other province (Stoerk 2017). So, any improvements in air quality are at least as much a reflection of a province-led initiative as something happening at city level. 
Conclusions
Based on our research in Dongguan, a more developed area of China, we have found that a more nuanced approach is necessary to analyses of the local environmental state. In reconceptualising the local state, we have argued that attention needs to be given to local development histories, the interplay between national and local policy agendas, and crucially the more flexible and multifaceted ways that environmental governance occurs. Regulatory activities provide high profile and visible evidence of efforts to curb the activities of polluting firms. Commitments to a cleaner environment, enable investment in environmental enhancements and increase the potential to attract low carbon and high-tech firm. This can further accelerate the transformation of the local economy. Our development of the Protean Environmental State marks a significant advance on existing approaches to the local state, at least as they apply to the more economically developed areas of China and to Dongguan in particular. The model of the developmental state promoted by Blecher and Shue (1996 and 2001) and of the entrepreneurial state advocated by Oi (1992) and Walder (1995) Continuing environmental improvements are helpful for the legitimacy of the Protean Environmental State but are not easy to achieve. There are a series of tensions that need to be managed. Support needs to be maintained for environmental improvements that may become more costly to achieve and whose benefits may be realised over a longer period. All the while, other interests are competing for resources. Resident and migrant populations will benefit from higher standards of air and water quality arising from more stringent enforcement of pollution regulations, environmental improvements, and the replacement of traditional polluting industries by cleaner
companies. There will also be new job opportunities in low carbon/high-tech firms. Whether these new jobs will be available to local people and particularly migrant workers is doubtful as they may lack the necessary training and skills. How improvements in environmental quality and employment prospects are perceived in the short and medium term will be important for legitimating the Protean Environmental State.
Another tension arises from the way in which the Protean Environmental State engages with national government. In its drive to improve the environment, national government is keen to ensure that pollution regulation at the local level is strictly enforced. Central go er e t s interest in regulation for environmental qualitywhere data is relatively easy to measure, monitor (and manipulate) -results in much greater accountability for both local political leaders and officials.
There is, though, a contradiction at play here: central government interventions and oversight of local government may provide reassurance to citizens that government is taking pollution seriously, but such actions also undermine the credibility of local regulatory activities. The Protean Environmental State will need to continually reinvent itself to demonstrate its worth. In doing so, its flexibility is helpful: regulation can be tightened or relaxed, or alternative emphases can be presented to the same or different audiences, or the focus of investments can switch between air, water or waste.
